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The Universal Meanings of Common
Discourse




1 A critical and aware return to pragmatism entails preliminary focus upon the possibilities
of productive communication and a possible exchange among fields of research often far
apart  in  terms  of  methods  and  spheres  of  application.  This  difficulty  is  even  more
significant if we refer to the intellectual legacy of George H. Mead, often divided between
opposing and conflicting fields of investigation.
2 This paper focuses upon Mead’s anthropological vision, seen in the light of an ethical
approach. On this basis, some new connotations of human complexity – expressed by Mead
or resulting from his works – may still  emerge,  enriching discussion of the ‘outside/
inside’ relationship that works in communicative processes and pointing out its role in a
new emerging notion of rationality. The belief that guides my re-examination of Mead’s
dynamics of the Self is relative to the strength and effectiveness of the work of renewal
performed by the pragmatist in a distinctive philosophical-anthropological field. It is a
renewal that involves some hypotheses of research whose value and effectiveness could
be suitably tested both in the sociological and political fields, effectively building a bridge
between the two sides.
3 My analysis develops from some general guidelines that have emerged in the intense
debate concerning “creativity” and “authenticity” that took place, notably in Germany,
during the 1990s.1 In dealing with problems connected with the theory of the self, Mead
scholars increasingly emphasized the role of the “I” within personality dynamics, both as
regards the function it exercises in constructing a personal identity and as regards its
specific  contribution  to  social  reconstruction.  In  formulating  a  theoretical  position
inspired by his studies on Pragmatism, in Die Kreativität des Handelns Hans Joas outlines a
concept of creative action as: “a third model of action” to add to the two predominant
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types: the rational action and the normatively oriented action. The model of action proposed
stresses the creative nature of human action, and points out that a creative dimension
exists in all human action, a dimension inadequately expressed in the neo-Weberian and
neo-Parsonian models (Joas 1996). A similar commitment – partially addressed to a re-
examination of Habermas – is present in some works by Honneth, collected in a volume in
1995. In this essay collection, Honneth reformulates his concept of personal autonomy in
terms  of  a  decentred  autonomy, that  is,  also  taking  into  account  the  “unconscious
spontaneity of the I,” considered a key concept in understanding processes of the Self in
their entirety and complexity.  Therefore,  Honneth’s concept of  decentralized autonomy
represents his response to the decentralization of the subject, set in motion by Nietzsche’s
criticism of the classical concept of autonomy and supported by Freud’s psychoanalytic
theory through the discovery of unconscious involuntary impulses that compel human
action. By connecting Mead’s social psychology and Winnicott’s psychoanalysis, Honneth
proposes  an extended  psychoanalytical  conception  of  inter-subjectivity,  according  to
which the unconscious and the uncontrollable forces of  the linguistic meaning event
show themselves as constructive conditions for the acquisition of personal autonomy. In
this  way,  according  to  Honneth,  a  comparison  with  the  conception  of  the  subject
emerging from psychoanalysis confirms and extends his theory of recognition (Honneth
1995, 2002).
4 Joas  and  Honneth  seem to  agree  that  the  renewal  of  philosophical  attention  to  the
process of individualization may permit a more open and direct comparison even with
positions  inspired by an ethics  of  authenticity, more or  less  directly  linked to  Charles
Taylor’s indications (Taylor 1991).
5 Honneth observes that the philosophical-political debate of the 1970s and 1980s almost
always led to unsatisfactory results regarding the ‘pathologies’ of social integration: 
[…] with the exception of the more recent works of Charles Taylor, which in the
form of a conceptual clarification of the idea of authenticity, point in the direction of
a substantive philosophical diagnosis of the present era. (Honneth 1995: xxii)
6 Joas, on the other hand, stresses the positive role exerted by Taylor – together with Berlin
– in contrasting “utilitarian tendencies of Enlightenment” by means of an expressionistic
counter-model of action (Joas 1996: 128). Indeed, the two social philosophers maintain
that in proposing a ‘post-metaphysical’  foundation for an ethics of  authenticity,  it  is
important to underline how in Mead the inter-subjective dimension of the “Self” is not in
contrast with a recognized value of the expressions of “I.” In some sense, in fact, inter-
subjectivity is inherent to that we call the intra-subjective dynamics of “I/Me” dialogue. In
agreement with a certain interpretative tendency – more or less connected to the debate I
quote above (Ferrara 1998; but also Tugendhat 1979) – these two interpretations converge
on the possibility of recovering an anti-substantial notion of authenticity, a convergence
that is also informed by Mead. In this way, it becomes possible to give to all questions of
authenticity a new direction, radically different from the one toward which various lines
of research – more or less vaguely inspired by Heidegger’s approach to this problem –
have seemed to lead.
7 I agree with this requirement and, on this point, I think it is essential to set acting – rather
than being – at the centre of philosophical  attention.  However,  I  also think that it  is
possible to perform another,  but no less important, step by reflecting upon the path
covered by Mead as regards the whole question of creativity, conceived by the pragmatist
as the authentic stuff of humanity. Concerning this point, the major problem becomes the
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constitution of  a  series  of  new points  of  reference starting from Mead’s  suggestions,
which  I  here  indicate  as  the  dynamics  of  human  nature and  its  temporalist, or  better,
historicist constitution.
8 Can  an  idea  of  human  nature lose  its  ontological  foundation  without  losing  its
effectiveness in supporting universal ethical values such as the dignity of the human person
or – on the legal  and political  side – the universality of  human rights? Can a radically
individualized notion of the human person, such as the one that we infer from Mead’s
suggestions better work out this problem? Moreover, can a new notion of authenticity
connected to Mead’s idea of the value of individuality offer a more believable answer to
the need for a renewed civil ethics that distinguishes our time?
9 We know that, according to Mead, thanks to linguistic mediation, the genesis of the “I”
takes place in a radically inter-subjective context, so that it manifests the personal, unique
and unrepeatable perspective of every individuality. In its manifestations, the motives for
individual action emerge, made up of personal needs, impulses, aspirations and desires.
No personal experience appears meaningless inside this frame of reference. The various
productions of the ‘I’s experience’ originate and develop according to specific modalities;
among them, the role of  imagination in experiential  processes appears irreplaceable.
Rationality is depicted as complex and dynamic, not confined to logical-formal processes
of organized thought, but involving and containing within it all the processes of ideas
formation, including those connected to the so-called unconscious activity of the Self. A
sort of imaginative reason originally produces language itself, instrument and vehicle of
social transformation. Within this framework, the notion of perspective assumes a role of
great significance. It represents not only the possibility of combining universalism and
‘pluriversalism,’ as in W. James or A. N. Whitehead, but precisely locates “sociality” as the
place of the intersection of meanings and communicative exchanges (Mead 1932).
10 Given  this  background,  it  would  be  interesting  to  investigate  the  effects  of  those
philosophical-anthropological  views  that  emerge  from  Mead’s  idea  of  the  creative,
temporalist, or historicist, processes through which all selves build their humanity. In this
direction, it could be decisive to consider the dynamics of ‘intra-subjective and inter-
subjective communication’ that,  in Mead’s view, constitute the horizons of one’s own
perspective (i.e. something more complex than a simple inner/outer point of view), that is,
the constitutive moments of an ethical self-construction of human beings. On these bases,
the peculiarity of human creativity, in all its complexity, reveals itself as the starting
point for a responsible normatively oriented conduct. At the same time, the excesses of a
unidirectional,  and  biologically  oriented, reading  of  the  human  constitution  clearly
demonstrate their boundaries.
11 I believe that the entire framework of Mead’s philosophy that would result could better
delineate the same idea of creative action. For some critics, Joas unsatisfactorily define
the latter results in his 1992 book Die Kreativität des Handelns (Colapietro 2009). Above all, I
see a close relationship between creativity of the self and responsible conduct. In Mead,
motives  for  actions  lie  in  a  kind  of  behaviour  in  which  the  moment  of  conscious
responsibility constantly links itself with the expression of what is novel in experience. In
this way, moral life sustained by social ends and fed by all the knowledge that science can
offer, in a certain sense, demands the creativity of the Self (Mead 1934: 178).
12 These indications demonstrate how reading Mead’s texts in this sense could emphasize
those aspects linked to the expression of individual creativity and their relationship with
social reconstruction. Concerning this point, it also seems important to stress how, in
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general,  processes  of  “taking-roles”  refer  to  an  idea  of  rationality  strengthened and
enriched by imagination, that is: a ‘poietic’ rationality, which is effective and productive in
creative acting.  In  this  way,  an  original  anthropological  paradigm  is  attested  too;  a
paradigm that can still be a source of inspiration for a pattern of civil life and democratic
citizenship.
 
Experiencing Creativity: the Function of Imagery
13 My first step consists in recalling the role that the imagery covers in an iconic form of
outer/inner communication, able to reconnect to the process that I will indicate as a
continuous – conscious and unconscious – ‘stream of experiences.’ Creativity, in fact, has
to be experienced.
14 According to Mead, in experiential dynamics, the images have the double function of
memory and prediction.  They connect themselves to the memory of  experiences but
resurface unintentionally in view of possible future reorganizations:
Toward  that  which  is  emerging  our  action  takes  us  and  what  is  disappearing
provides the conditions of that action. Imagery then comes in to build out both
stretches. We look before and after, and sigh for what is not. (Mead 1934: 345)
15 The images  of  old  experiences,  meaningful  in  their  visual  immediacy,  belong to  the
unconscious sphere of the Self and potentially represent the matter on which so-called
introspection –  thought  by Mead as  self-communication –  applies  itself.  Unlike what
Freud has maintained, the unconscious of which Mead speaks represents a sort of store of
resources from which the “I” can freely draw during the fortuitous connections and
reconnections of experience. Even if the relationship between Mead and psychoanalysis is
recurrent in philosophical debate, Mead’s reservations regarding Freud’s theory are well
known, and I think we must take them for granted:
In the more or less fantastic psychology of the Freudian group thinkers are dealing
with the sexual life and with self-assertion in its violent form. The normal situation,
however, is one which involves a reaction of the individual in a situation which is
socially determined, but to which he brings his own responses as an ‘I.’ (Mead 1934:
211)
16 In the passage quoted above, Mead refers to “the normal situation” as a context within
which a form of “social control” operates by means of the ‘I/Me’ dialogue. This is: “[…] the
control which the individual is able to exercise over his own responses” (Mead 1934: 254).
The function of the “Me” in experiential processes represents a sort of translation of the
language of the social group and it constitutes a threshold that the “I” must exceed. In
this sense – but only in this sense – the “Me” represents “a censor” (Mead 1934: 255). In
the intrasubjective experience in which it operates, the “Me” represents the receptacle
for ever-new acquisitions linked to a change in customs and to the enrichment of the
patrimony  of  shared  social  values.  This  change  and  enrichment  derive  from  the
progressive passage into the “Me” of the contents of the “I” that have been recognized at
the level of the social group.
17 Mead’s psychological views do not appear reductive relative to the nature of impulses or
substantial  as  regards  the  nature  of  the  unconscious.  At  any time,  creativity  can be
realistically expressed in artistic or scientific productions that seem to temporarily stop
and crystallize the stream of  experiences, but never the thread of connections between
conscious and unconscious junctures forever defining the boundary between separate
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worlds as in Freudian theory. In these connections, imagination operates as a form of
‘unforeseeable thought’, not illogical nor alogical, but endowed with a peculiar kind of
logic that operates by experiencing the interconnections between objects and images,
facts  and  dreams,  weighted  reflections  and  unrestrained  daydream.  So,  from  this
viewpoint it becomes important not only to stress how a Freudian unconscious sphere
can become a condition rendering autonomy possible by means of its recognition in inter-
subjectivity,2 but also to pay attention to the particular function exercised by that same
sphere  in  constituting  individual  conduct  with  relation  to  future  achievements.  The
contents of the “I” that are not able to assert themselves at a particular time do not, in
fact, lose their potential validity as regards still-unspecified future situations. As we will
see with reference to the aesthetic experience, the fluidity of temporality expressed by
Mead plays a fundamental role in defining experiential processes.3
18 Thus, it seems relevant to consider the contribution of this kind of apparently free logic to
the complex formation of the identity and authenticity of every Self. The process of self-
production seems to be oriented in a peculiar direction thanks to the specific angle from
which every “I” intervenes on a personal store of images of experiences, connecting and
mixing them according to unique modalities, to set up a specific perspective. In the self-
reflective processes within which combinations of ideas and images express themselves,
creative productions emerge because of personal and often fortuitous and unpredictable
connections.  When  this  process  is  intentional,  it  produces  the  individual’s  original
responses that can give body to works of art, new world visions or value proposals.
19 Imaginative activity is thus an integral part of logical processes within which it exercises
a predictive function. The apparently aseptic phases of the act of reflecting described by
Mead in  The  Philosophy  of  the  Act are  not  ‘troubled’  because  of  the  discovery  of  the
variegated  context  in  which  they are  found  to  work,  that  is,  among  free  play,  or
occasional  encounters,  or  the  variegated  combinations  of  images  that  continuously
succeed  each  other.  In  experiential  processes,  inter-subjective  and  intra-subjective
communications mutually interfere, exchanging their positions in a complex intersection
of perspectives. This web of perspectives with its weave of subjectified and objectified threads
at last constitutes the entire universe of meanings.4 In this way, transfer within the Self of
the contents of the so-called interior experience cannot occur automatically,  as in H.
Bergson,5 through a sort of imposition necessitated by the spiritual strength of a deified
creative activity. Also, in this sense, the “I/Me” communication has a ‘democratic’ role:
that of translating the proposals of the “I” into a socially shared language, relating –
without enslaving them – to the habits, norms and values recognized in the social group.
 
Suggestions from Emerson: Art, Imagination, and the
Taking-Role
20 Following  Mead’s  indications,  therefore,  we  can  outline  a  dynamic notion  of  human
creativity, set  and  kept  in  motion  by  the  activity  of  the  “I,” an  activity  in  which
imagination has a vital function and promotes the use of a language orienting activity
toward ever-new objects. The role of imagery in experience thus returns as a problem in
this philosophical research, where a prominent role is given to the value of discovery.
21 Of course, these assumptions do not mean that a ‘visionary logic’ prevails in the thought
processes and that imaginative activity has a greater role than reason. Rather, it means
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that one gives to the other material to work on, using communicative instruments that
are functionally but not substantially different among them. Just as for Peirce, also for
Mead a logic of discovery needs to recognize and to assign a precise role to abductive and
iconic moments, that is, to the predictive and representative moments of every logical
process.  Mead,  however,  goes  further  than  Peirce  does  in  the  applied  part  of  his
epistemological project. His intent consists in demonstrating the practical relapses of the
pragmatic assumption relative to the ‘real nature’ of human rationality; an expressive
and creative ‘nature’ in which logical, ethical and aesthetic experiences work together to
recognize the primary normative character of a radically human action. This action is
situated because the agent too is a situated being, but it has the capacity to inscribe itself
upon its surroundings thanks to its inherent creativity.
22 Nevertheless, I think it is important not only to recall the influence of the expressivist
European tradition on the pragmatist’s theory of creative action (Joas 1996) but also the
influence of Transcendentalism upon American philosophy between the end of the 19th
and the beginning of the 20th centuries (Nieddu 2001). In fact, even Mead and Dewey,
whilst  persuaded  Darwinians  not  sharing  the  cosmological  background  of
Transcendentalism, were not averse to some striking Emersonian suggestions. Dewey’s
link to Emerson’s source is more definite than Mead’s and, perhaps, the resonance of
some ‘romantic’ echoes in Mead derives from the influence of Dewey. In this paper I do
not analyse this problem or, in general, the problem of the relation between the two
pragmatists. I prefer to concentrate on the particular way – original in more than one
aspect – in which the memory of Transcendentalism operates in Mead’s ethical and social
thought.
23 As regards these problems, students’ notes on a series of lessons on social psychology –
held  by  Mead  in  1914  and  first  published  in  1982  by  David  Miller  –  are  extremely
significant.  Their  subject  is  the  relationship  between  art,  imagination,  and  role
assumption.  The  latter,  in  some  ways,  seems  to  need  the  artist’s  social  function.
According  to  Mead,  it  seems  possible  to  grasp  the  relationship  between  literature,
philosophy, psychology and social science recognizing the effectiveness of literary tools
in the portrayal through imagery of the ‘stream of experiences.’ They appear more ‘realistic’
as  regards  those  elaborated  by  means  of  the  best  philosophical,  psychological  and
sociological analysis and interpretations. In literary expressions too, the logical connections
between the representations mentioned above and the actions triggered by them are more
vivid and efficacious, and sometimes more ‘truthful.’ Obviously, these suggestions coming
from Mead do not mean that literature should take the place of other disciplines. I rather
think that he – like Emerson and Whitman – fruitfully underlines the value of a joint
collaboration between them.6 However, I take for granted too that scientific knowledge is
born not out of this working agreement. It seems to me that for the pragmatists of every era
fallibilism is the only precondition for every assumption. As in Dewey so in Mead, the
giving up the claim that one’s truth coincides with absolute truth really represents the
unique form of religion consistent with democratic life.
24 Therefore, I believe that the strength of Mead’s suggestions resides in the possibility of
enriching the chances of creating ever-new intersections of perspectives by means of every
human tool, according to some indications that he elaborated in the final years of his life
in The Philosophy of the Present. Nevertheless, before closing I would like to consider for a
moment some other of Mead’s insights on the relationship between aesthetic and ethic
experiences emerging from the lessons of 1914. What strikes us immediately in these
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lessons is the close relationship he reaffirms between taking role and imagination, a link
that allows us to see the direct analogy between social and ethical attitudes and artistic
production:  “Problems  involved  in  social  reforms  are  thought  out  through  persons
putting themselves in others’ places” – Mead affirms – and subsequently:
The way a community comes to realize a social evil is by taking the role of another
individual who is subject to injustice. The community needs that sort of imagery
and meaning. The artist is to a large degree working out that imagery which is most
useful in thinking. (Mead 1982: 98)
25 Art has always helped to strengthen social relationships and the intellectual growth of
peoples thanks to the creation of an imagery in which individuals can reflect upon group
values and identify with them:
The social function of the artist is to provide imagery for thinking from all points of
view. The community cannot bring itself to realize these other relations until it gets
imagery from the artist. (Mead 1982: 100)
26 The artist obtains this result by portraying problems and social evils with the instrument
provided by the significant images belonging to narration,  as occurs within different
literary expressions. In these affirmations, the assumptions of a philosophical conception
based upon sharing in the universality of  the significant products of  inter-subjective
relationships become explicit, without underestimating the contribution of the “I”:
[…] The individual in a certain sense is not willing to live under certain conditions
which would involve a sort of suicide of the Self in its process of realization. Over
and against that situation, we referred to those values which attach particularly to
the  ‘I’  rather  than to  the  ‘me’,  those  values  which are  found in  the  immediate
attitude of the artist, the inventor, the scientist in his discovery, in general in the
action of the ‘I’ which cannot be calculated and which involves a reconstruction of
the society, and so of the ‘me’ which belongs to that society. It is that phase of
experience which is found in the ‘I’, and the values that attach to it are the values
belonging to this type of experience as such. These values are not peculiar to the
artist, the inventor and the scientific discoverer, but they belong to the experience
of all selves where there is an ‘I’ that answers to the ‘me.’ (Mead 1934: 214)
27 The expressions of the “I” intervening in the formation of the individual Self are also
active in its relationship with the social context and make every individual unique in
their  ability  to  respond  authentically to  the  stimuli  of  variegated  human  situations
according to a particular, unique perspective: 
The fact that all Selves are constituted by or in terms of the social process and on
individual reflections of it – or rather of this organized behavior pattern which it
exhibits, and which they pretend in their respective structures – is not in the least
incompatible with, or destructive of, the fact that every individual Self has its own
peculiar individuality, its own unique pattern […] The organized structure of every
individual Self within the human social process of experience and behavior reflects,
and is constituted by, the organized relational pattern of that process as a whole;
but each individual Self-structure reflects, and is constituted by, a different aspect
or  perspective  of  this  relational  pattern,  because  each  reflects  this  relational
pattern from its own unique standpoint. (Mead 1934: 201)
28 On this occasion, it is not possible to analyse in detail the relapses of Mead’s concept of
perspective in the ethical-political sphere, particularly as regards the theme of justice or
the individual’s contribution to the establishment of shared values. The innovative aspect
of the theory of  perspectives in the field of  value production lies in the possibility of
drawing attention to  individual  contributions  to  the formation of  shared ideals.  The
uniqueness  of  the perspective of  every Self permits,  in fact,  the introduction of  new
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elements of discussion or proposals of values within the social group thus promoting
social  reconstruction and  democratic  growth,  set  in  motion  precisely  by  individual
responses (Mead 1934: 168).
29 In conclusion, it is worth pointing out how, even in light of the theory of perspectives, the
value assigned to the creativity of the “I” in proposing solutions to problems implicit in
the manifold forms of the Self’s experience is confirmed. According to Mead, the activity
of the “I” is more complex than the biological datum of spontaneity. The manifestations
of the “I” within the thought processes and the role they play in the social sphere thicken
the  frame  of  reference  of  the  human  universe.  Mead’s  philosophical  anthropology,
indeed, seems to focus upon a concept of the psychological diversity of individuals more
complex than that of the genetic diversity attested to in biology, however compatible
they may be. The fortuitousness of genetic combinations, in fact, changes itself in the
fortuitousness of the intersection of different perspectives.
30 The Self emerges from the increasingly complicated weave of intra-subjective and inter-
subjective  communication  that  takes  place  after  the  individual  has  developed  the
capacity to present herself within numerous perspectives. This communication promotes
a  mobile  representation  of  themselves  in  which  the  play  of  expectations,  volitions,
desires,  reminiscences,  recollections,  and  self-images  exerts  its  distinctive  role.  It  is
precisely  through  this  play  that  the  “I,”  articulating  its  expressions,  offers  its
irreplaceable contribution to the constructions and reconstructions of civil society.
31 In  this  way,  the  uniqueness  of  individual  responses  seems  to  lose  the  features  of
exactitude and absoluteness that characterize both the spontaneity of the “I” theorized
on a merely biological plane, as in Darwin’s theory of evolution, and the one conceived on
a merely spiritual plane, as in Bergson’s creative evolution (Bergson 1907). In the complex
self-constructive development of human personality, uniqueness is rather expressed by
the  non-repeatable  modality  in  which  what  Mead  defines  as  Mind –  attributing  a
linguistic-communicative,  relational  and thus  social  nature to  it  –  interacts  with the
“universe  of  thought” of  every Self (Mead 1934:  133).  These processes  constitute  the
varied, many-faceted ‘interior world’, which is not understood as a simple set of clarified
previous experiences, but as a sort of seething cauldron of expressive potentialities. The
latter  are  still  obscure  and  indefinite  because  they  have  not  been  engaged  at  the
conscious level or they are merely projected into the future as intentions, resolutions or
plans  for  action.  The  ability  to  be  responsible  in  achieving  self-fulfilment  and  self-
determination without sacrificing one’s authenticity,  cannot thus deprive itself of the
potential  value of  the multiple  and complex expressions deriving from those unique
combinations of conscious/unconscious dynamics constituting each personality.
32 Literature appears to Mead particularly effective in representing the modalities and the
disturbing outcomes of this complex and variegated way of experiencing themselves. A way
which is antithetical to Descartes’ cogito.
 
Universal Meanings and Chaotic Visions: Joyce versus
Descartes
33 Aesthetic  experience  springs  from  “consummation,”  a  particular  attitude  to  what
surrounds us and permits us to grasp its beautiful, gratifying elements.7 It is really that
substrate, made up of a texture of reason and sentiment, which represents the thread of
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the experiential process. It ensures continuity even in moments of absent-mindedness or
when action ceases. This happens every time we succeed in combining images of the past
with ideals  that  we would like  to  pursue.  According to  this  interpretation,  not  only
language, as a means of inner/outer communication, but also history lose any sort of
substantial  nature.  History,  in  particular,  propose  itself  as  a  privileged  field  of
experimentation of the various present/future finalities that we would like to achieve in
our “common action,” or specific situation. As Mead writes in The Nature of the Aesthetic
Experience:
While the aesthetic attitude which accompanies, inspires, and dedicates common
action finds  its  moment of  ideal  finality  in  future achievement,  the material  in
which its significance and beauty is fashioned is historic. (Mead 1964: 298)
34 The expression of these moments also animates literature: “Tolstoy, as an officer in the
war gives an account of having pictures of his past experience in the midst of his most
intense action” (Mead 1934: 137). In this example, which considers an everyday situation,
a contrast with an experience completely oriented towards external activity is present.
An experience:  “[…] in which the Self as an object does not enter,  and an activity of
memory and imagination in which the Self is  the principal  object” (Mead 1934:  137).
History  appears  simultaneously  as  the  archive  of  old  experiences  that  await  their
rebuilding and as the place of destination of what we would like to achieve:
All the stuff with which the most creative imagination works is drawn from the
storehouses and quarries of the past. All history is the interpretation of the present,
that  is,  it  gives  us  not  only  the  direction  and  trend  of  events,  the  reliable
uniformities and laws of affairs, but it offers us the irrevocableness of the pattern of
what has occurred, in which to embody the still uncertain and unsubstantial objects
we would achieve. […] All this is healthful and normal. In its perfection, it reaches
the field of  the fine arts,  but  it  involves the creative imagination and aesthetic
appreciation of the least artistically endowed of those who are fortunately engaged
in the rewarding undertakings of life. (Mead 1964: 298)
35 Therefore,  in  more  than  one  way,  “the  stuff” which  humanity  is  made  of  appears
temporalist and historicist as well; “continuity” represents the keystone of the human way of
relating to time and history, as Mead writes in The Nature of the Past:
The past which we construct from the standpoint of the new problem of today is
based upon continuities which we discover in that which has arisen, and its serves
us until the rising novelty of tomorrow necessitates a new history which interprets
the  new  future.  […]  Within  our  narrow  presents  our  histories  give  us  the
elbowroom to cope with the ever-changing stream of reality. (Mead 1964: 353)
36 Passages such as this portray perfectly the interpenetration of time and nature, history
and human beings. The ‘authentic nature’ of humanity reveals itself historic, not ethically
determined  by  the  settled  ethos  but  intrinsically  connected  to  that  “ever-changing
stream of reality” that represents the battlefield upon which the normative action of
human beings has to engage. History, in turn, is not just an arid collection of facts. It is
not simple erudition but philosophy of humanity. For an Italian reader – but not only – in
this assumption resounds an echo of G. Vico’s La scienza nuova, and I really think that it
would be very interesting to analyse thoroughly this connection, as has been done in the
case of Peirce.8 However, on this occasion I will simply indicate a future line of research
and, rather, consider Mead’s nearest sources of inspiration.
37 As we have seen, according to Mead the best representation of what I  call  stream of
experiences is the variety of the artistic experiences. In The Nature of Aesthetic Experience,
he examines the ways in which the thought processes also develop through the free play
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of fantasy and imagination. He distinguishes between pure daydreaming – “stream of
reverie”  (Mead 1964:  300),  which has  no bearing  upon reality,  but  only  produces  in
certain circumstances useful escapes to relieve subjective distress – and the work of the
imagination. This latter shows itself in ideal meanings, generated by the aspirations of
the moment. These aspirations, in turn, throw human conduct toward the future in the
form of  projects.  And these processes always begin from the concreteness of  human
needs; a concreteness that triggers motivations of acting and situational thinking that are
capable of influencing conduct normatively through the imaginative representation of
rewarding expectations.
38 In fact, in approaching the objects of experience two distinct dimensions, two forms of
approach that relate to two distinct orders of purpose are given. In the first dimension:
“[…] we give attention only to that which forwards the undertaking: we see and hear only
enough  to  recognize  and  use,  and  pass  from  the  recognition  to  the  operation.”  By
contrast, in appreciation: “[…] we contemplate, and abide, and rest in our presentations”
(Mead 1964: 297). Action is no longer continuous, it is not continuity of experiences in itself.
According to Mead’s suggestions, what I call the stream of experiences is made up of a
variegated mixture of thoughts and tastes that accompanies every moment of ordinary
life. This complex constitution builds the humanity of human animals:
The artisan  who stops  to  sense  the  nice  perfection  of  a  tool  or  a  machine  has
interrupted its use to appreciate it and is in an aesthetic mood. He is not interested
in  its  employment,  he  is  enjoying  it.  The  statesman  who  turns  from  the
construction of his speech, the ordering of his statistics, the meeting of political
opposition,  the  whole  technique  of  putting  across  his  projects  for  bettering
conditions and life of children, to the picture of their healthful and joyous life, is for
the time being no longer in action. He is savoring the end that he is fashioning into
practicable politics.  When one stops in his  common labor and effort  to feel  the
surety of his colleagues, the loyalty of his supporters, the response of his public, to
enjoy  the  community  of  life  in  family,  or  profession,  or  party,  or  church,  or
country,  to  taste  in  Whitmanesque  manner  the  commonalty  of  existence,  his
attitude is aesthetic. (Mead 1964: 297-8)
39 In Mead’s opinion, literary expressions – novels and poetry – together with theatrical or
cinematographic production can represent the functioning of the Self better than many
psychological or sociological treatises. They can dwell upon the digressions of the “I” in
images that clarify the contents of the full experience of the Self, including irrelevant,
scandalous  or  risky  imagery.  At  some particular  communicative  levels,  depictions  in
narration or performance of the intense, often disjointed, activity of estrangement of the
Self may exercise an extremely important cathartic function:
[…] There should be a certain release, and relief from restraint, which comes from
the fulfilment of the escape reaction with a richness of imagery which the inner
imagination can never offer. If these escape reactions play any legitimate part in
the economy of keeping house with one’s Self, and I think they do, the elaboration
of  them  at  just  the  point  where  the  imagination  fails  should  emphasize  that
function, and the enjoyed imagery is genuinely aesthetic. (Mead 1964: 304)
40 At  other  times,  literature  vividly  and  sometimes  brutally  expresses  psychological
situations consisting of chaotic visions produced by an incessant emergence from desires,
disconnected  memories  and  unspeakable  experiences,  as  happens  in  Joyce’s  Ulysses.9
However, in spite of everything, the expression of the private and disjointed imaginings
of the characters in Ulysses, writes Mead:
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[…] passes into the universal meanings of common discourse and cooperative effort, and
out of it arise the forms of universal  beauty,  the intuitions of the inventor,  the
hypothesis of the scientist and the creations of the artist. It is that part of the inner
life  of  man  which  cannot  be  given  its  implicated  meaning  because  of  the
incompleteness of social organization. (Mead 1964: 300, my italics)
41 In other words, in its most noble manifestations creativity functions as a complication of
those  very  mechanisms  that,  when  they  act  freely,  produce  dreams  and  empty
daydreams, speaking the same language. Mead’s recognition of the undeniable value of
even  those  expressions  of  creativity springing  from  the  unconscious  mechanisms  of
thought is implicit in the possibility of future acquisition of the proposals of the “I” on the
part of society. The fact that at certain times society is not ready to accept them, Mead
seems to suggest, does not diminish the communicative value of the productions of every
individuality.10
42 The  radically  inter-subjective  constitution  of  subjectivity  enable  Mead  to  certify  the
possibility of a sympathetic and emotional communication of meanings, whether totally
or partially shared. In Whitman and in Emerson, and according to Mead as well, only the
poet speaks the real authentic language, creating new meanings and, at the same time,
protecting those still sharing in ‘ordinary’ life situations. After all, in ‘The Poet’ Emerson
stated that in the poetic imagination is the ‘place of birth’ of language,11 according to a
line  of  thought  to  which  pragmatism has  long  been  thought  to  be  averse,  however
mistakenly:
[…] the poet is the Namer, or Language-Maker, naming things sometimes after their
appearance, sometimes after their essence […]. The poet made all the words, and
therefore language is the archives of history, and, if we must say it, a sort of tomb
of the Muses. For, though the origin of most of our words is forgotten, each word
was at first a stroke of genius, and obtained currency, because for the moment it
symbolized the world to the first speaker and to the hearer. (Emerson, 1844)
 
Conclusion
43 The relationship between the constructive moment of the individual personality and the
reconstructive  moment  of  the  interpersonal  relationship  by  means  of  which  social
transformations  occur  certainly  deserves  further  attention.  This  problem,  surely  an
important subject for discussion as regards the topic of the democratic ideal, should also
be relevant in the light of the new concepts that philosophical anthropology proposes in
its various anti-substantial forms. Criticism of an abstract rationalism now appears as a
common denominator in these expressions. Awareness of the risk of assuming positions
of an irrational or radically sceptical kind, bordering on nihilism, is likewise shared and
shareable.  I  think  that  these  latter  positions  invite  us  to  return  to  the  sources  of
pragmatism in its classical formulations. In that of George H. Mead, the interpretation of
what I have tried to define as a form of imaginative rationality, leaving space for an idea
of creativity founded upon the dynamics of the Self, still demands careful consideration.
In Mead and in Dewey, the appeal to the ordinary and to everyday life ceases to identify
itself with the established and/or the idiosyncratic and it becomes the reference to the
dimension of commune and community. It is important to understand this dimension in
all  its  complexity  and  richness  precisely  because  of  the  radically  inter-subjective
constitution  of  subjectivity  that  subtends  Mead’s  self-theory.  In  this  perspective,
normativity also does not arise – or impose itself – from the outside but is somehow
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constituent of every subjective intentional determination. Along these paths, pragmatic
relativism objectifies itself, refusing to make absolute but erecting a steady barrier to
skepticism and nihilism.
44 In  the  light  of  these  observations,  the  question  of  the  contribution  that  classical
pragmatism can  still  offer  may  be  presented  on  a  broader  basis  and  refer  to  some
neglected issues that deserve revival. I am convinced that the value and effectiveness of
these research hypotheses could be suitably tested both in the sociological and political
fields; among these, the relation-ship between ethical and aesthetic experience – the loci
of human action together with logic – assume a particular relevance,  to connote the
qualifying  character  of  being  human. This  relationship  has  been  overlooked  in  many
respects,  partly  because  of  the  overall  homogeneity  of  historical  interpretations  of
pragmatism, and partly owing to the controversial  issues related to its  descent from
Transcendentalism.  Questions  connected  to  the  variety  of  dimensions  of  human
constitution find productive application in Mead’s theory of perspectives and then run
through Dewey’s logic. Along this line, it is possible to discuss once more crucial ethical
and political issues, such as that of “creative democracy.” The pragmatist’s researches,
especially  on  the  anthropological  side,  use  a  genetic  and  evolutionary  approach  to
problems  concerning  the  relationship  between  thought  and  action.  This  approach,
especially  in  Mead,  immediately  escapes  the  narrow  mesh  of  an  environmental
deterministic  naturalism  to  reveal  a  phenomenological  account  of  the  complex  and
variegated processes of experience. Logic, aesthetics and ethics derive from those common
human needs that constitute the grounds of genetic creativity, and it is not possible to
create hierarchies of values between artistic productions, scientific skills or daily living
discoveries (Mead 1934: 214). The problem of the relationship between imagination and
intelligence and the other question, connected to it, but not overlapping, concerning the
role of images in experience, find in Mead’s proposals new, and productive, formulations.
His  anti-dualistic  approach,  loyal  to  the  tradition  of  pragmatism,  underlines  all  the
richness and complexity of experiential human processes. Even if it is often abused, we
could use the expression post-Darwinian to define Mead’s rewriting of human evolution; an
undertaking that, perhaps unexpectedly, leads him near to that place of the ‘second birth’
of humanity, as Vico suggests in his Scienza nuova:  the starting point of a new human
nature.
45 This ‘nature’ is not given but always needs to be rebuilt with a steady ethical commitment,
if we believe that no part of humanity has the right to define itself as ‘civilized’ every
time it ceases its struggle for create civilization.
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NOTES
1. The most relevant stages of this debate are Joas 1992; Joas 1997; Honneth 1992; Honneth 1995,
and, in Italy, Ferrara 1998.
2. On this theme, see Honneth (1995: 261-72).
3. The stream of experiences that I am talking about refers evidently to William James’ stream of
consciousness, but in some way also implicates Bergson’s durée réelle. I dealt with these themes in
Nieddu 2005; Nieddu 2011.
4. I  refer  particularly  to  Chap.  III  of  The  Philosophy  of  the  Present (‘The  Social  Nature  of the
Present’) and to one of the Supplementary Essays: ‘The Objective Reality of Perspectives.’
5. I refer chiefly to the spontaneity of Bergson’s “moi fondamentale” (Bergson 1889). Mead shares
Bergson’s idea relative to the temporalist substratum of subjectivity but he does not agree with
its immediate expressivity.
6. In contemporary philosophical-political  debate,  Nussbaum (1995;  2010) expresses the same
demand. Nevertheless, she refers to the Transcendentalist tradition – in particular to Whitman –
‘bypassing’ the most productive suggestions of pragmatism, like those derived from Mead’s idea
of human constitution.
7. I refer to part D (‘The Stage of Consummation’) of the ‘General Analysis of Knowledge and the
Act’ (Mead 1967).
8. I refer, for example, to the studies that Max Harold Fish and Marcel Danesi dedicated to the
Peirce-Vico relation.
9. In  Joyce’s  most  famous  novel,  the  ‘stream  of  consciousness’  flows  directly  into  narrative
language. Mead read the chapters of Ulysses first published in The Little Review, a Chicago literary
magazine.
10. This was also the destiny of Joyce’s Ulysses.
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11. Vico had already expressed a similar conviction in his “sapienza poetica” (Vico 1730: 135ff.).
On this point of contact between the Italian philosopher and Emerson, see Bloom 1975.
ABSTRACTS
A critical and aware return to pragmatism entails a preliminary focus upon the possibility of
productive communication and a possible exchange among fields of research often far apart in
terms of methods and spheres of application. This difficulty is felt all the more strongly if we
refer to the contested intellectual legacy of George H. Mead, one often divided between opposing
and conflicting fields of investigation. In this paper, I propose a reinterpretation of his thought
that I believe could operate transversally. To do so, I interpret Mead’s idea of human creativity in
a more radical way compared with some previous interpretations. This way, it is possible to see
the  constructive  role  of  the  relation  between  inter-subjective  and  intra-subjective
communication as constitutive moments in an ethical self-construction of human beings. Finally,
the peculiarity of human creativity, in all its complexity, shows itself as the starting point for
responsible,  normatively  oriented  conduct.  Moreover,  a  new  anthropological  paradigm,  also
emerging from Mead’s suggestions, could become a source of inspiration for a renewed pattern
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